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Abstract. I connect commodification arguments to an empirical literature, present a mechanism by 
which commodification may occur, and show how this may restrict the range of  goods and services 
that are subject to commodification, therefore having implications for the use of  commodification 
arguments in political theory. Commodification arguments assert that some people’s trading a good or 
service can debase it for third parties. They consist of  a normative premise, a theory of  value, and an 
empirical premise, a mechanism whereby some people’s market exchange affects how goods can be valued 
by others. Hence their soundness depends on the existence of  a suitable candidate mechanism for the 
empirical premise. The “motivation crowding effect” has been cited as the empirical base of  
commodification. I show why the main explanations of  motivation crowding—signaling and over-
justification—do not provide mechanisms that could underpin the empirical premise. In doing this, I 
reveal some requirements on any candidate mechanism. I present a third explanation of  motivation 
crowding, based on the crowding out of  frames, and show how it fulfills the requirements. With a 
mechanism in hand, I explore the type of  goods and services to which commodification arguments are 
applicable. The mechanism enables markets to break down “shared valuations”, which is a subset of  
the valuations that proponents of  commodification arguments are concerned with. Further, it can only 
break down relatively fragile shared understandings and therefore, I suggest, it cannot support a 
commodification argument regarding the sale of  sexual services. 
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 Many people have the intuition that there are some goods and services that should not be 
bought and sold. But there is little agreement on what and why. The what and why questions are 
intertwined.  
 When thinking about why some things should not be for sale, we can contrast essentialist 
arguments, which hold that it constitutes a harm to buy and sell some things, with arguments against 
trade because of  its bad effects (Satz, 2010). Essentialist arguments capture the idea that market 
exchange degrades or corrupts some goods and practices (Sandel, 2012). To take the example of  
prostitution, an essentialist argument against prostitution is that it is inherently degrading to the 
prostitute, a non-essentialist argument is that prostitution reinforces gender inequality. It is clear that 
non-essentialist arguments about what should not be for sale rely on the existence of  corresponding 
mechanisms that show why sales have bad effects. 
 However, even essentialist arguments may rely on the existence of  mechanisms. Some 
corruption arguments go further than the idea that trade is corrupting for the buyer or the seller, 
asserting that that some people’s trading a good or service can debase it for third parties (Anderson, 
1993; Radin, 1987, 1989). To take the example of  prostitution again, the idea is that some people’s 
buying and selling sex degrades what is valuable about sex for everyone. The overall shape of  the 
argument is that if  a good or service is treated like a commodity by some people, then it takes on the 
characteristics of  a commodity for everyone, so let us call these commodification arguments.  
 Commodification arguments combine elements of  the essentialist argument, about the 
inherent negative effect of  sales, with an argument about its effects on third parties. Another way of  
putting this is that they consist of  a normative premise and an empirical premise (Radin, 1989, p.173). 
The normative premise is a theory of  value according to which it is important that the non-market 
version of  some goods and services is available. The empirical premise is that, once some people treat a 
good or service as a commodity, then it is debased for everyone. Some people’s behavior affects other 
people’s valuations. The soundness of  commodification arguments depends on the truth of  the 
empirical premise, on the existence of  a mechanism that would cause market exchange to drive out 
moral and civic values for third parties.  
 A mechanism that supports commodification as an answer to the why question will also have 
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implications for the answer to the what question. We buy and sell many goods and services, and it is not 
plausible that the value of  all these things is corrupted by the market. If  we can establish a mechanism 
by which commodification might occur, then we can assess what goods and services may be vulnerable 
to that mechanism and, hence, to commodification. I will present a mechanism by which 
commodification may occur, an exercise in moral psychology that answers the why question, and then 
show that the mechanism has implications for what goods and services may be commodified and 
therefore has ramifications for political theory. 
 There has been remarkably little detailed work on mechanism. Michael Sandel (2012) cites 
experimental evidence of  motivation crowding, which shows that paying people can have perverse effects 
on their behavior, as support for the idea that markets drive out non-market norms and values. 
However, this evidence is about changes in behavior, not valuations. If  motivation crowding is to 
support the empirical premise of  commodification arguments (hereafter, abbreviated to “empirical 
premise”), then the change in behavior needs to be connected to changes in valuations. Further, 
motivation crowding experiments show that paying someone can change that person’s behavior, 
whereas commodification arguments are about the effects of  market exchange on third parties. There 
is no empirical literature on motivation crowding in third parties, which is what commodification 
arguments require. 
 A lot of  weight rests on motivation crowding, so it is appropriate to investigate how 
successful it is as a mechanism of  commodification. I will show that the two main families of  
explanation for motivation crowding, based on signaling and over-justification mechanisms, cannot 
support the empirical premise. In doing this, I will reveal some further requirements on any mechanism 
that purports to underpin the empirical premise. I will then present an alternative explanation for 
motivation crowding that relates it to framing, or how people conceive of  their situation, and show how 
this could support the empirical premise. With a mechanism that could underpin the empirical premise 
in hand, I assess the extent of  the support that it provides to commodification arguments. Granted that 
commodification arguments are an answer to the why question, I explore the implications of  the 
mechanism I present for the answer to the what question. The mechanism puts conditions on the type 
of  goods and services that are subject to commodification, the scope of  commodification arguments is 
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limited to goods and services that satisfy these conditions, which may exclude some popular targets. 
 My aim is to assess the maximum extent of  support for the empirical premise of  the 
commodification argument, by presenting a mechanism that could underpin it. I do not claim that it is 
the only possible mechanism. However, I do not think that there are any other promising candidates 
for the empirical premise, so I think that proponents of  commodification arguments will have to 
accept something like my mechanism if  their arguments are to be sound. If  a reader should think the 
mechanism implausible or incorrect, then so much the worse for commodification arguments. 
1. Commodification arguments, the empirical premise, and Titmuss’s puzzle 
 The best developed commodification arguments are due to Elizabeth Anderson (1993) and 
Margaret Radin (1989, 1987), and their arguments have the same structure: a normative premise 
containing a theory of  value, and an empirical premise about contagion. 
 Anderson (1993) provides a pluralist theory of  value, where there are different modes of  
valuation that are appropriate to different kinds of  goods. She distinguishes two types of  goods: intrinsic 
goods, which are the immediate objects of  our valuations, and extrinsic goods, which are those things that it 
makes sense to value only because one values some other thing. One subset of  extrinsic goods is those 
that have use value, in that they are only valued as a means to some other end.  Money, and many of  the 1
things that are bought and sold on markets, have use value. Anderson claims that use value is an 
inferior mode of  valuation to valuing goods intrinsically.   
 Anderson supplements this normative premise with a second, empirical premise: that putting 
goods up for sale debases their intrinsic value. She does not provide a general mechanism by which 
commodification occurs, but she takes prostitution as the “classic example” (1993, p.154). Anderson 
claims not only that commodified sex is degraded and degrading to the prostitute (a general corruption 
argument), but that there are also “deep connections between the ways women’s sexuality is valued by 
men in both [the market and personal] spheres” (p.155), so that if  women’s sexuality is legally valued as 
a commodity, then it may be difficult “to establish insulated social spheres where it can be exclusively 
and fully valued as a genuinely shared and personal good” (p.155).  Therefore, Anderson thinks that 2
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some markets need to be restricted for the sake of  freedom and autonomy, in order to promote access 
to a wide range of  significant options and to preserve superior modes of  valuation. 
Radin, like Anderson, draws on the Kantian notion of  people as ends in themselves, but she 
puts the emphasis in a different place, on the distinction between persons and things. Radin claims that 
some goods and services are integral to the self, they are so important for our “personhood” and for 
human flourishing that to understand them as monetizable and completely detachable from the self  “is 
to do violence to our deepest understanding of  what it is to be human” (1987, p.1906). Radin does not 
provide a general theory about which goods and services are integral to personhood, but she gives 
babies and sexual services as obvious examples.  
Radin’s (1989) empirical premise is that the commodified and non-commodified versions of  
some interactions cannot co-exist, so commodifying something can prevent its non-commodified 
analogue from existing. She says that “Once something has a price, money must be a part of  the 
interaction, and the reason or explanation for the interaction, when that something changes hands. A 
sale cannot simultaneously be a gift.” (p.175). Radin illustrates the idea with respect to blood. (This is 
despite the fact that she is most interested in the market for sexual services and is ambivalent about 
whether her argument applies to blood.) She says that if  the price of  a pint of  blood is $50, then giving 
a pint of  blood becomes like giving $50 of  money; anything special about giving blood rather than 
money is destroyed (p.170).  
 Eric Mack (1989) has been skeptical about the empirical premise. In particular, he targets 
Radin’s example of  how giving a pint of  blood becomes like giving $50 of  money. Mack argues that the 
value that he puts on gifts is not the same as their price and he says that anyone who equates the value 
of  a gift with its price is making a mistake. He alters the example, so that the item being given is a 
Christmas gift of  a sweater to his wife, and considers why he would rather give her a sweater than its 
cash value or its value in gift vouchers. He concludes that giving a sweater is not the same as giving 
money.  This is plausible, but it is not my focus here. Mack then turns the question around, asking: if  3
non-market relations are so much better than commodified ones, why don’t people continue using non-
commodified versions when markets are introduced? By the end of  this paper, I will have provided an 
answer. 
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Mack may be right to be skeptical about Radin’s example. However, that does not resolve the 
argument about the empirical premise which, after all, is an empirical question about whether, in 
Anderson’s language, selling a good or service can debase its value for others, or, in Radin’s language, 
commodified and non-commodified versions of  a transaction can coexist, and, for both authors, 
whether some people’s market transactions (behavior) can affect the ways in which others can value 
those goods and services. But let me suggest another source of  skepticism that arises from considering 
Mack’s example. Like the sweater, the gifts that we give are often commodities that can be bought. 
Sometimes we can even guess the price of  a gift. However, it doesn’t devalue Mack’s gift to his wife if  
she knows that he bought it in a shop and that it cost $50. She may well prefer to receive the sweater 
from him than a $50 note. Radin (1987, p. 1912) says that commodification is a “slippery slope” and 
uses the metaphor of  dominos, where pushing over the first domino causes the rest to topple, but it is 
not credible that any step towards commodification of  any good must lead to total disaster. The 
sweater is partially commodified and most people do not find that to be a problem. To give Anderson 
and Radin due credit, both recognize the possibility of  partial commodification or, as Anderson puts it, 
“mixed goods”. However, the empirical premise is not plausible unless there is a mechanism that can 
explain why some goods become devalued by partial commodification but not others. Why are gifts of  
blood commodified but not gifts of  sweaters? A suitable mechanism should answer this question. And 
can the answer tell us anything about what other goods and services are likely to be commodified? We 
might hope that the mechanism would also give us some guidance about what properties of  goods or 
their social context makes them vulnerable to commodification. In underpinning the why question, it 
should put boundaries on the what question. 
 It is no coincidence that Radin used an example involving paying for blood. One of  the earliest 
commodification arguments is found, at least implicitly, in Richard Titmuss’s (1970) The Gift Relationship. 
Titmuss presented a case study of  the methods for the provision of  blood in several countries, in 
particular the UK and the US. Both these countries collected blood through voluntary donations but, in 
the UK, the entire blood supply was obtained from donations, whilst the US at that time also operated 
commercial blood banks, which paid people for their blood. Titmuss argued that the market for blood 
in the US discouraged voluntary donation, and that less blood was supplied than would have been the 
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case in a purely voluntary system. He also conducted a survey of  donors’ motivations. Titmuss 
concluded that the result of  paying for blood was that, “Both the sense of  community and the 
expression of  altruism are being silenced” (p.157). He thought that it is important that areas of  social 
life exist where we can engage in altruism, so with the introduction of  payment something valuable had 
been lost: “private market systems … deprive men of  their freedom to give” (Titmuss, 1970, p.239). 
 Although he cited evidence from national data on blood collection, Titmuss was criticized by 
two Nobel Laureate economists for not providing an explicit mechanism that would cause these effects. 
Robert Solow (1971, p. 1696) thought that “the story seems far-fetched” and Kenneth Arrow regarded 
it as “speculative thinking” because of  the concentration on empirical evidence rather than theoretical 
analysis (Arrow, 1972, p.143). Titmuss left a puzzle: why introducing a market alongside a previously 
existing non-market mechanism would have caused donations to decrease or, more generally, why some 
people engaging in market exchange affected third parties’ behavior.  In honour of  its origins, let us call 
this question about the behavioral mechanism Titmuss’s puzzle.  
 Titmuss’s puzzle has a parallel structure to the empirical premise of  commodification 
arguments. Both posit that there will be a spillover effect of  markets on non-market participants. 
Titmuss’s puzzle is about a spillover effect of  behavior: some people’s buying and selling affects others’ 
behavior. The empirical premise is about a spillover of  behavior on valuation: some people’s buying 
and selling affects others’ valuations. The empirical premise seems more intractable than Titmuss’s 
puzzle. After all, there are many ways in which some people’s behavior can affect other people’s 
behavior, starting with simple imitation. But people have thought that Titmuss’s puzzle and the 
empirical premise are connected, and Titmuss’s own conclusions about his findings suggest that the 
change in behavior corresponds to a change in valuations (although Titmuss’s own argument differs 
from commodification arguments since he does not claim that there is some intrinsic feature of  blood 
that means it should not be commodified, but rather that there should be some areas of  social life 
where such altruism is possible). I will go on to present a mechanism that can solve Titmuss’s puzzle 
and show how it can also underpin the empirical premise. 
  
2. The motivation crowding effect: an empirical effect in need of  a theoretical explanation  
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 Michael Sandel (2012) draws on examples of  motivation crowding to show that market values 
can crowd out nonmarket norms, and many people think that motivation crowding can solve Titmuss’s 
puzzle (see Frey & Jegen, 2001 and references within). The motivation crowding effect is a behavioral 
phenomenon first documented by Edward Deci (1975, 1971), who found that subjects who had been 
paid to solve puzzles were less likely to return to them later, after payment had been withdrawn, than a 
control group who had received no reward for their activity in the first period. The paid subjects also 
reported a lesser interest in the task than the unpaid. These results have been replicated in numerous 
other experiments, in the laboratory and in the field. (For literature reviews and meta-analysis see 
Cerasoli, Nicklin, and Ford, 2014, Frey and Jegen, 2001, and Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999.)  
 Deci hypothesized that the extrinsic motivation of  the reward replaced the subjects’ intrinsic 
motivation, where “[o]ne is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives 
no apparent reward except the activity itself.” (Deci, 1975, p.175) So extrinsic motivation is doing 
something for an apparent reward and intrinsic motivation is simply defined in contrast to extrinsic 
motivation, as anything that is not done for a tangible reward. Intrinsic motivation includes many 
different sorts of  reasons for undertaking an activity including, for example, enjoyment of  a task, 
other-regarding reasons, or moral reasons.  
Deci’s hypothesis is simple and powerful. Simple because it postulates that, since people no 
longer do the task for free, they are no longer intrinsically motivated. Powerful because of  the range of  
phenomena it can potentially explain. The motivation crowding effect has been used in models to 
explain why increasing incentives in the workplace will not necessarily increase output (Kreps, 1997), 
why countries with stricter constitutions would have more tax evasion (Frey, 1997a), and why increasing 
punishment does not always decrease crime (Akerlof  & Dickens, 1982). But a complete theory will 
need to say more about why people cease to be intrinsically motivated.  
Deci’s hypothesis captured the imagination. However, to prevent ambiguity, note that I use 
“motivation crowding” and “motivation crowding effect” to refer to the body of  empirical results and 
not to any specific hypothesis about what causes the effect. (In fact, one might note that Deci himself  
drew on more detailed theories to explain the effect, from Cognitive Evaluation Theory in his 1975 
book to the broader Self-Determination Theory in Deci and Ryan, 2000.) One might see the 
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mechanism I will present as elaborating on the hypothesis that extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic 
motivation, but if  one prefers to think of  it as an alternative hypothesis, that will not have any bearing 
on the argument of  this paper. 
Deci argued that “Every reward (including feedback) has two aspects, a controlling aspect and 
an informational aspect” (1975, p.42). Deci thought that the informational and control aspects would 
work in opposite directions, with payment as a signal of  success in the task, which would 
counterbalance the negative effect of  its controlling aspect. But nowadays, both aspects are seen as 
having a negative effect, and each of  them has formed the basis of  a family of  theories about the 
operation of  motivation crowding: that introducing payment “over justifies” the agent, which causes 
her to change her preferences and hence behavior, and that payment is a “signal” which changes 
information and hence behavior.  In this section, I assess to what extent each of  these theories can 4
provide a mechanism that would explain Titmuss’s puzzle and that could underpin the empirical 
premise. The reader may be able to think of  other candidates for a mechanism, but these are the two 
that have garnered most attention in the empirical literature, so I focus on them. 
One mechanism that has been proposed to cause the motivation crowding effect is based on 
the control aspect of  rewards. Amongst psychologists, the predominant explanation for motivation 
crowding is the over-justification of  the agent, where the payment is seen as controlling, and the external 
intervention therefore undermines feelings of  self-determination and autonomy, which causes the 
agent to relinquish the intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000).  This is 5
compatible with the classic experiments, where agents do not get to choose whether or not they are 
paid. In contrast, in the case study presented by Titmuss there were two systems (the market and the 
voluntary system) running side-by-side and, if  the agent has a choice between receiving payment or not, 
why should feelings of  self-determination or autonomy be impaired? 
The idea that having two systems will increase choice suggests another way of  putting Titmuss’s 
puzzle. If  we grant that there is a variety of  types of  agent in the population, then we might expect that 
having multiple mechanisms for collecting blood would lead to a higher supply because different types 
would be induced to give blood by different collection systems (Frey, 1997a). The fact that Titmuss 
found that blood collected in the market regime was more likely to be infected with hepatitis is a sign 
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that payment attracts a different group of  people. The puzzle is why payment would have caused the 
previous group of  voluntary donors to withdraw. A basic tenet of  microeconomics is that increasing 
the range of  alternatives leaves an agent at least as well off  because if  she prefers one of  the new 
alternatives she can switch and, if  not, it is still open to her to make the same choice as before. This is 
exactly what Titmuss denies. He claims that, although it allows some men to live as they like, the market 
“narrows the choices for all men” (Titmuss, 1970, p.310-11). For Titmuss, it is not just that there have 
been changes in motivation, but also that some options have been eliminated.  
Standard examples of  motivation crowding are intra-personal, payments to an agent affect that 
agent’s behavior. Titmuss presented a more complicated, inter-personal puzzle—payments to one agent 
affect another agent’s behavior. Frey (1997a) suggests that there will be a “spillover effect” between the 
two systems, but he does not elaborate. A satisfactory explanation of  Titmuss’s puzzle will have to 
include an explanation of  the mysterious spillover effect. 
Another family of  explanations understands motivation crowding within the signaling literature, 
where the use of  financial incentives changes information about the agent or about the task. (So, 
although signaling theories purport to explain the motivation crowding effect, they jettison Deci’s 
hypothesis about the driving out of  intrinsic motivations.) One signaling explanation of  motivation 
crowding is based on the idea that someone may engage in an activity in order to give others 
information about herself. For instance, if  there are different “types” of  agent in the population, some 
who are altruists and some who are not, then engaging in a civic activity may be a signal that a person is 
an altruistic type. Paul Seabright (2002) and Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole (2006) propose game-
theoretic models where altruists give blood as a signal of  type in anticipation of  later games where they 
want to be able to match up with other altruists. In these models, offering payment for blood donation 
encourages non-altruists to donate and makes the signal “noisy”. Since donation is done by both 
altruists and non-altruists it is no longer a reliable indicator that someone is an altruist. This makes it 
less useful as a signal, so altruists donate less than before payment was introduced. The participation of  
non-altruists spills over and affects the behavior of  altruists, whose signal is destroyed. However, as 
well as thinking that it is a strange sort of  altruist who only donates blood as a signal, we might doubt 
that this mechanism operates in Titmuss’s puzzle. We generally do not know of  any particular person 
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whether they have given blood, and there is no public register we could check, so it is hard to see how 
agents could use it as a signal of  their types. 
Alternatively, offering payment may send a signal to someone, either about herself  or about the 
task. Benabou and Tirole (2003) have proposed that, in a workplace environment, an employer who 
offers incentive payments may send a negative signal about the worker’s ability or about the disutility of  
the job. With regard to Titmuss’s puzzle, an information asymmetry where the donor does not know 
some piece of  information about herself  that the authorities do know is not relevant (and Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006, acknowledge this).  An information asymmetry where payment is a signal of  the 6
unpleasantness of  the experience might be relevant. It could explain why payment would deter 
potential first time donors. However, blood is mainly given by repeat donors (Healy, 2000) and, since 
the payment would have to convey information that the agent does not already have, the theory that 
payment is a signal of  unpleasantness cannot explain why these donors would stop giving. For the same 
reason, it cannot explain the results of  the standard motivation crowding experiments, where people 
are already engaging in the task in the first period and the withdrawal of  payment causes them to lose 
interest.  
The most plausible signaling explanation for Titmuss’s puzzle is that donors are sending signals 
to themselves (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). On this account, the agent has a set of  preferences or values, 
and a set of  second-order preferences about what values she has or what type of  person she is. At the 
time of  taking action, the agent knows her preferences, but after taking action, she only remembers the 
action and not the underlying values. In this situation, the agent may choose actions partly in order to 
manipulate her self-image at a later time. Applied to Titmuss’s puzzle, the idea is that donating blood is 
a sign that the self  is an altruist, so people give in order to self-signal as altruists. However, if  an 
unavoidable payment is introduced, then the signal is muddied—maybe the earlier self  was motivated 
by the payment?—so donation done for self-signaling purposes decreases. This is is slightly different to 
Titmuss’s puzzle, since the fact that the payment is unavoidable is an important part of  the explanation: 
if  there were two systems, the voluntary system and the market, then one could self-signal by making a 
the voluntary donation instead of  taking payment. In any case, it seems unlikely to be of  help with the 
empirical premise, which requires that some people’s actions affect how goods are valued by others. 
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The signalling account is a model of  self-deception (Mijović-Prelec & Prelec, 2010); self-signaling 
donors are not really motivated by altruism and when they stop donating their values do not change. 
This reveals an underlying problem with all the signaling explanations: even if  they explain Titmuss’s 
puzzle, that explanation will not port to the empirical premise because they do not involve any change 
in valuations. Hence, even if  you find signaling explanations persuasive as a solution to Titmuss’s 
puzzle, they do not provide a foundation for the empirical premise of  commodification arguments.  
This discussion has revealed that an explanation of  motivation crowding needs to account for 
several different ways that payment affects behavior. There is an effect of  withdrawing payment, as in 
Deci’s experiments. There is an effect of  the introduction of  payment on agents already engaged in an 
activity, as in Titmuss’s puzzle. And there is a spillover effect, whereby payment may affect behavior 
even when a non-payment system is maintained alongside the market. Further, an explanation of  
motivation crowding that would suffice to underpin the empirical premise must relate behavior change 
to value change. 
3. The connection between framing and motivations 
 Lindenberg and Frey (1993) claim that when motivation crowding occurs a “gain frame” crowds 
out a “normative frame”, but this is not explained in any further detail. Framing is often implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly offered as an explanation of  the effect of  payments on effort (e.g., Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2000; Heyman & Ariely, 2004). But there is no detailed conceptual explanation of  the 
framing effect on first parties, let alone third parties as required by the empirical premise. 
We can think of  the agent’s frame as the set of  concepts that she uses to think about her 
situation (Bacharach, 2003). Framing is notorious because of  Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) work on 
framing effects, where two groups of  subjects were given the same options, described differently, and the 
description affected the choices that their subjects made. In Tversky and Kahneman’s original 
experiment they asked subjects to imagine that the US was threatened by a disease that was expected to 
kill 600 people, and that they had to make a choice between two alternative vaccination programmes. 
Half  the subjects were told the options in terms of  how many people would be saved (200 people 
saved vs. a 1/3 probability that 600 people would be saved), the other half  were given the same options 
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phrased in terms of  how many people would die (400 people die vs. a 2/3 chance that 600 people 
would die). Since the subjects know that 600 lives are at stake, one of  these pieces of  information 
should suffice. However, changing the description of  the options from one in terms of  “lives saved” to 
one in terms of  “lives lost” changed the modal choice: in the first group 72% of  subjects chose the 
program that would save 200 people (with 400 dying), in the second, 78% of  subjects chose the 
program with a 2/3 chance that 600 would die (and a 1/3 chance that 600 would be saved). 
  In Tversky and Kahneman’s framing effect, there were two policies to choose between. The 
outcome of  a policy choice had two aspects: number of  people who would be saved and number of  
people who would die. Even if  people are only explicitly told only one of  these consequences, we 
expect them to be able to work out the other. However, changing the set of  concepts in terms of  
which the decision was presented, from “save” to “die”, affected choices. I will give two examples that 
connect framing effects and motivations, in order to motivate a treatment of  motivation crowding 
using some of  the ideas that have been brought to bear on framing effects.  
 My first motivating example is a real-life policy decision, which seems to take the possibility of  
motivation crowding seriously and whose structure is analogous to Kahneman and Tversky’s framing 
effect. The economic analysis of  crime suggests that the amount of  criminal activity is inversely related 
to the severity of  punishment and the probability of  getting caught (Becker, 1968). In contrast, a 
standard example in the motivation crowding literature is that increasing punishment does not 
necessarily decrease crime. In Melbourne in 2002, Yarra Trams ran a campaign against fare dodging. As 
a part of  this campaign, they instituted a system of  random inspection and on-the-spot fines. But this 
was not the way they presented it to the public. The slogan for the campaign was “Fare evasion is 
stealing”.  Instead of  emphasizing that the chance of  being caught and punished had increased, Yarra 7
Trams appealed to a form of  intrinsic motivation, with no official sanctions or incentives. So Yarra 
Trams behaved as though they were anticipating a motivation crowding effect. The potential motivation 
crowding effect also looks like a framing effect. Deciding to evade one’s fare is a choice whose outcome 
has two aspects: having done something dishonest, and incurring a risk of  being caught and punished. 
As in Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment, even if  people are only explicitly told one consequence we 
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expect them to be able to work out the other. But Yarra Trams chose to emphasize only one of  the 
consequences, so it looks like Yarra Trams was taking advantage of  a framing effect. 
Figure 1. Prisoner’s dilemma 
Figure 2. Decomposed prisoner’s dilemma 
My second motivating example is a framing effect that researchers have hypothesized is caused 
by a change in motivations. It involves giving subjects different presentations of  the same prisoner’s 
dilemma matrix, known as decomposed games (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Pruitt, 1967).  The most 8
familiar presentation of  games uses a standard payoff  matrix. Figure 1 gives an example of  the 
prisoner’s dilemma payoff  matrix. Each player must choose between C and D and their payoffs depend 
upon the combination of  their choices. Whatever the other player does, each player is better off  
choosing D (which gets 18 rather than 12 if  the other chooses C, or 6 rather than 0 if  the other 
chooses D). However, if  both players choose D they each get a payoff  of  6, whereas if  they had both 
chosen C they would each have got 12. It may be possible to decompose a payoff  matrix so that, 
instead of  presenting the payoffs in a matrix form, the players have to choose one of  two allocations 
of  payoffs between the players. Figure 2 presents one possible decomposition of  the “parent game” of  
Figure 1; each player knows that the other also faces the same allocation decision. Calculating the 
payoffs for each player that would result from the four different possible combinations of  the 
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allocation decisions (CC, CD, DC, DD) gives the outcome matrix of  the parent game. For instance, in 
the decomposed version, if  Player 1 chooses allocation C and Player 2 chooses allocation D then Player 
1 has assigned 0 to herself  and 12 to Player 2 whilst Player 2 has assigned 6 to herself  and 0 to Player 1. 
So Player 1 gets 0 from herself  and 0 from Player 2, a total of  0. Player 2 gets 12 from his choice and 6 
from player one, a total of  18. The outcome is 0 for Player 1 and 18 for Player 2, as can be read off  
from the parent game. In any decomposed game, it is possible to work out the payoff  matrix from the 
choices in the allocation decision.  The decomposition and the parent game are two different ways of  9
presenting the four possible payoff  outcomes. 
Dean Pruitt (1967) gave one group of  subjects the parent matrix shown in Figure 1 and another 
the decomposed version of  the game shown in Figure 2. Each pair of  players played a series of  twenty 
games. Although the decomposition and the parent game are two different ways of  presenting the same 
information about end monetary outcomes, Pruitt found that the rate of  co-operation differed in each 
presentation. In the parent game, the “[p]ercentage of  cooperation remained at a relatively constant 
level” whereas, in the decomposed game above, it “rose precipitously and remained at a high 
level” (Pruitt, 1967, p.24). The decomposition increased cooperation. This effect has also been found in 
3-person prisoner’s dilemmas (Komorita, 1987) and 4-person prisoner’s dilemmas (Cookson, 2000). In 
a further investigation designed to discover why behavior was different in the decomposed games, 
Pruitt asked subjects to record the thinking behind their decisions (Pruitt, 1970). He discovered that, in 
accordance with expectations derived from game theoretic reasoning, those who played D in the above 
games were motivated by the payoff  they could get by doing so. In the decomposed game, responses to 
open-ended questions showed that many subjects viewed alternative C as a way of  being “helpful” or 
“generous”. Pruitt (1970, p.235) postulated that “the games produce differing motives, which in turn 
produce differing behavior”, a suggestion that has also been made by Colman (1995) and which 
indicates a connection between framing and motivations.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explained their framing effect using prospect theory. According 
to prospect theory, decision makers are risk averse over gains but risk loving over losses, so it matters 
whether they perceive outcomes as gains or losses. Whether an outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss 
may depend on the decision-maker’s reference point, which may be affected by the way a decision 
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problem is framed. If  “save” connotes rescuing someone who would otherwise be dead, then the 
reference point is 600 people dead and the choice is over different gains; people are risk averse, going 
for the smaller number of  sure dead rather than gambling and trying to save everyone at the risk of  
losing all 600. If  “die” connotes losing a person who is currently alive, then the reference point has 600 
people alive and the choice is over losses; people are risk loving, and they take the gamble. However, it 
is hard to see how prospect theory could explain the framing effects in my motivating examples. 
Decision theorists have given explanations of  framing effects that relate them to reasons 
(Dietrich & List, 2016; Weirich, 2010; Gold & List, 2004; Schick, 2003). What the different models have 
in common is that the reasons that underpin an agent’s choices depend on how they frame or, in the 
case of  Schick (2003), “understand” the decision. Note that acting and choosing for a reason does not 
have to be understood as involving a conscious reasoning process. A minimal requirement is that the 
agent is disposed to be responsive to reasons, where these are based on facts that count in favor of  a 
particular decision or action. In this paradigm, framing effects occur when there are reasons in favor of  
both options and the reason that the agent responds to depends on the way in which the decision is 
presented or described. In effect, these agents are not weighing all their reasons, but act on the basis of  
a single reason. If  they have an acceptable reason to hand, then they do not search for others. This has 
psychological plausibility. It is consistent with evidence of  “concrete thinking”, whereby decision-
makers appear to use only surface information and information that has to be inferred from the display 
or created by some mental transformation tends to be ignored (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1988; 
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978). Concrete thinking may be connected to people’s desire to 
justify decisions by saying that they chose for a (single) reason, even to the extent of  constructing and 
selecting choice situations such that there is always a dominant reason for choice (Montgomery, 1983). 
Once a reason for choice has presented itself, people are not motivated to seek out further reasons. Call 
this “one-reason decision-making”. 
In Tversky and Kahneman’s problem, the fact that some people will die for sure is a reason not 
to choose the policy with certain outcomes, while the fact that there is a possible outcome where no-
one is saved is a reason not to choose the risky policy. The two different ways of  framing the decision 
make these different reasons salient, which affects people’s choices (Gold & List, 2004). This 
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explanation is in accordance with the psychological literature on “reason-based choice”. A classic 
example there is the custody decision, where the question of  which parent should get custody elicits the 
same answer as the question of  which parent should not get custody: the questions elicit a search for 
positive and negative attributes respectively, which would be reasons for giving or not giving custody, 
and one parent has both more positive and more negative attributes (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 
1993).  The idea that the presentation of  the decision affects the reason that people act on can explain 10
the framing effects in my motivating examples. Reasons are connected to motivations. We can think of  
the reason for which an agent acts as her motivating reason, so framing can affect an agent’s motivating 
reason. 
In the Yarra Trams example, the fact that fare evasion is dishonest is a reason to buy a ticket. 
However, there is another way of  looking at the decision, the one that is assumed in the economic 
analysis of  crime, namely that not buying a ticket is a gamble with a large probability of  saving a small 
amount of  money and a small probability of  paying a fine if  caught. In that case, someone who is 
moderately risk loving might have a reason to take the gamble rather than incur the sure loss of  buying 
a ticket. “Fare evasion is stealing” frames the decision whether or not to buy a ticket as one of  honesty, 
rather than gambling. This idea that this would affect decisions is supported by evidence from the 
laboratory. James Baldry (1986) gave one group of  subjects an income and the option to lay a series of  
small bets. A second group were given the same income and gambles but the experiment was presented 
as completing a tax return, with the gambles as small tax evasion decisions, where there was a 
probability of  random audit and financial penalties any time a subject was caught evading. Of  course, 
they were still really laboratory gambles. However, the behavior of  the two groups was strikingly 
different. In the gambling condition, every subject laid the maximum possible bet on every round but, 
in the tax evasion condition, subjects tried to evade the maximum possible amount in only 38% of  
decisions, and in 31% of  decisions there was no evasion attempt at all. Baldry concluded that the tax 
evasion scenario had triggered “moral compunctions”. People may be willing to take small gambles, but 
not when they are framed as a matter of  obeying the law, so it matters whether Yarra trams framed the 
fare evasion decision as a moral decision or as a gamble. 
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In the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma, game-theoretic reasoning about monetary payoffs 
conflicts with being helpful or generous. This is sometimes referred to as “might versus 
morality” (Liebrand et al, 1986). According to Pruitt (1970) and Colman (1995), the decomposition 
makes helpfulness, or the moral side of  the coin, more salient. Their suggestion is supported by 
evidence that the way that subjects frame the prisoner’s dilemma correlates with the move they make. 
Subjects who perceive playing C as co-operative and playing D as non-co-operative are more likely to 
play C (Baranowski, & Summers, 1972). Similarly, co-operative types (defined as such because they 
behave co-operatively) tend to frame the dilemma in terms of  morality (Liebrand et al, 1986). If  moral 
reasons support a different choice from game-theoretic dominance reasoning and the salience of  these 
reasons can be affected by the presentation of  the decision, then people will make different choices in 
different frames.  The reason-based explanation of  framing effects is consistent with the evidence of  a 11
connection between framing and behavior in prisoner’s dilemmas, but refines it by offering a direction 
of  causality, namely that framing the game in moral terms may lead to co-operative behavior by 
increasing the perception of, and hence the chance that people act on, moral or other-regarding 
reasons.  12
 Relating choices to motivating reasons also provides a connection between valuation and 
behavior, which I identified above as one of  the requirements of  a mechanism that could underpin the 
empirical premise. When an agent acts, we can say that she has a pro-attitude that either is or is based 
on her motivating reason (depending on our precise technical philosophical take on “motivating 
reason”).  Most philosophers would agree that these pro-attitudes are grounded in considerations 13
about the goodness or value of  what is desired. Therefore, when an agent’s motivating reason changes, 
so does the value that she acts on. Framing can connect motivations and values. 
 In this section, I have connected motivation crowding to framing and reasons, and therefore to 
valuations. A caveat is due. I gave two examples that look like both motivation crowding and framing 
effects. However, in most examples of  motivation crowding there is an actual change in the situation, 
as well as a change in framing, so they are not framing effects.  Framing effects are generally thought 14
to be irrational because a change in description leads to a change in choice without any change in the 
underlying situation.  I am not claiming that all motivation crowding effects are framing effects and I 15
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do not mean to make any claim about the rationality of  motivation crowding. I am concerned with 
framing rather than framing effects. The idea is that the process that underlies framing effects, the 
process of  framing, whereby changing the way that people frame a problem changes their motivating 
reason, can operate in other choice situations, including ones of  motivation crowding. 
4. A framing explanation of  the motivation crowding effect 
The paradigm examples of  motivation crowding do not involve changes in explicit descriptions. 
However, the monetary payment may still affect the way subjects frame the situation. Take Deci’s (1975, 
1971) experiments, where subjects were given puzzles to solve. There were two periods in this 
experiment. In the second period, subjects were left alone in the room with the puzzles. This was the 
same for all subjects. In the first period, half  of  the subjects were paid to solve puzzles and half  of  the 
subjects played with them without payment. Deci found that first period activity affected second period 
behavior, even though naïve theory suggested that the second period was the same for all subjects. The 
first period activity may have served as an implicit framing task. The puzzles were supposed to be 
interesting to solve for their own sake. Subjects who were paid were given another way to think about 
the puzzles: as an activity engaged in to make money. In the second period, the monetary payment was 
withdrawn. If  the subjects who had been paid framed the task of  solving them in terms of  money, and 
acted on their monetary motivations, then their reason for solving the puzzles would have gone. 
Concrete thinkers, who do not generally search for information, would not investigate whether there 
were other reasons to carry on solving the puzzles.  
Deci’s experiments involved the withdrawal of  payments. Above I said that an explanation of  
motivation crowding must also explain why the introduction of  payment would affect the behavior of  
agents who are already engaged in a task. When an agent is performing a task that she has intrinsic 
motivation to do and she is also being paid, then her action is over-determined. There is a sense in 
which she is over-justified—because she has multiple reasons in favor of  her action, not because the 
price is seen as an instrument of  control. If  people are one-reason decision-makers, then one of  the 
motivations will become the primary motivating reason, at the expense of  any others. In the puzzle 
solving example subjects started off  being paid, so there is reason to think that monetary reasons are 
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salient and that the non-monetary reasons may never strike them. But when payment is introduced, 
subjects are already performing the task based on non-monetary motivations. Why should the 
monetary rather than the non-monetary reason become the motivating reason?  
In order to answer this, we can draw on findings from social and cognitive psychology. From 
social psychology, we know that the salience of  the reward affects motivation crowding. Ross (1975) 
has shown that a highly salient reward is more detrimental to intrinsic interest than the same reward 
when it is relatively non-salient. He also showed that reward is less detrimental when the subject’s 
attention is distracted from it. Payments may be salient, especially in workplace examples, where there is 
a series of  incentive payments over time. This may keep attention focused on the payment, reinforcing 
the monetary motivation. The idea that monetary reasons will come to dominate intrinsic ones is also 
supported by attribution theory, according to which actors are more likely to attribute their behavior to 
external factors than internal ones (Jones et al, 1972; Heider, 1958). So attribution theory would predict 
that, if  agents are offered payment, then they will attribute their motivation to the payment, rather than 
any intrinsic motivation they may also have had. 
We can also draw on studies of  concept usage from cognitive psychology to understand how 
monetary motivations can crowd out non-monetary ones. Researchers have studied the effect of  
priming, or activating particular representations just before carrying out an action or task. Evidence from 
the priming paradigm is that frequent use of  a concept increases its accessibility, defined as the 
“activation potential of  available information” (Higgins, 1996). And, if  a concept is not used then, as 
time passes, it decreases in accessibility. So even if, at one point, the agent is aware of  both monetary 
and non-monetary concepts, and hence monetary and non-monetary reasons, the evidence suggests 
that a stream of  payments can reinforce the monetary way of  framing the situation at the expense of  
the non-monetary one. (An even stronger claim than this is made by Bruner (1957), who postulates that 
once an agent has categorized a situation, incongruent cues may be “gated out”.)  This mechanism 16
explains the contention of  Lindenberg and Frey (1993), that a “gain frame” will “crowd out” other 
ways of  framing the task. Once financial gain is the motivating reason, then it becomes likely that 
withdrawal of  payment leads to cessation of  the activity, by the mechanism described above.   17
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 Above, I connected reasons to valuations, with reasons being grounded in considerations about 
the goodness or value of  an option. Therefore, an agent’s motivating reason reflects the values that 
ground her choice. When an agent’s motivating reason changes, so does the value that she acts on. As a 
reason that is not acted on falls out of  the picture, so may the values that it is based on. If  a gain frame 
crowds out a normative frame, then the way that the agent values the activity may change too. 
So far, I have shown how the framing mechanism can account for the effect of  withdrawing 
payments and the effect of  introducing payments, and that it relates behavior change to value change. 
This is enough for the mechanism to explain how general corruption—in Sandel’s (2012) sense—may 
occur. But it is not yet sufficient to explain Titmuss’s puzzle or the empirical premise. 
5. Explaining the spillover effect: the breakdown of  shared valuations 
Standard examples of  motivation crowding involve the introduction and withdrawal of  
payments to the same agent. Titmuss’s puzzle contained an extra complication, the spillover effect, where 
payments to one set of  agents affected other agents’ behavior.  
In the paradigm framing effects, a label is introduced or emphasized and that affects behavior. 
This is also an aspect of  Titmuss’s puzzle. The introduction of  payment for blood in the US introduced 
both a new action, selling blood, and a new label: the act previously described as “not giving” could also 
be described as “not selling”. The new label is important. An agent might think that one ought to give 
blood, but that it is fine not to sell it. Therefore, if  people are induced to change the way they describe 
the actions, from giving to selling, they may change their behavior.  
 Why might agents change the way they describe the action? In the standard motivation 
crowding examples, I argued that a salient way of  framing the situation, sometimes caused by repeated 
use of  a concept, crowds out other ways of  thinking about the situation. However, in Titmuss’s puzzle, 
payment is being offered to others. Presumably the payoff  on offer is not terribly salient and it is also 
possible to avoid it. Assimilating Titmuss’s puzzle to standard motivation crowding does not seem 
plausible.  
 However, there is a mechanism involving framing that would resolve Titmuss’s puzzle, which 
draws on another mode of  valuations in Anderson’s taxonomy. The value of  shared goods is dependent 
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on other people enjoying the item according to shared understandings of  what they mean; “shared 
understanding” is left as an intuitive notion (Anderson, 1993). Michael Walzer (1983) and Charles 
Taylor (1985) each appeal to a something like a shared understanding. Walzer argues that we should 
distribute goods in accordance with their social meanings, our shared conceptions of  what they are and 
what they are for. He says that social meanings are guides to why we value things and, once we know 
why we value something, we can think about what distributive mechanism is appropriate for it. Taylor is 
more concerned with how we interpret social behavior. He introduces notions of  “common meanings” 
and “inter-subjective meanings” which are constitutive of  social reality. Between them, these provide a 
set of  common terms of  reference that render social practices meaningful to those who participate in 
them. I will use the terminology of  “shared understandings” to refer to this whole cluster of  ideas.  
 My notion of  “frames” relates to at least some of  what is meant by “understandings”. (Indeed 
Schick (1991) casts his theory, which is a framing theory of  choice, in terms of  “understandings”.) The 
way that an individual frames her decision can affect the reasons she perceives as relevant and how she 
values her options. So a shared understanding is a common way of  framing a situation. 
 However, an important feature of  shared understandings or shared frames is that they entail 
more than just everyone having the same individual understanding or frame. There is a thicker sort of  
shared-ness at work here. At the very least, as well as having the same understanding, individuals also 
have to believe correctly that others have the same understanding. This is similar to the philosophical 
idea of  “mutual belief ”. Taylor (1985, p.197) has an even stronger idea of  shared understanding. He 
says of  common meanings that they are not just shared in the sense that everyone has them, nor are 
they simply known to be shared, but they are also common in the sense of  “being in the common 
reference world.” By this, Taylor means that the sharing is communally sustained. 
While a frame is a feature of  an individual’s psychology, if  a shared understanding exists then it 
is a fact about the world, albeit one that is based on the psychology of  the individuals within it. There is 
a normative aspect to understandings: someone might think that we ought to understand or frame a 
good or service in a particular way, related to particular values that she has and thinks others ought to 
have. However, whilst an individual might think that a good or service ought to be a shared good, 
presumably related to the way that she understands or frames it as an individual, she cannot decide that 
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there will be a shared understanding and that the good will be valued in that way, independently of  how 
other people understand it. 
Selling blood is a market transaction. Markets are individualistic modes of  interaction, in the 
sense that participating in a market exchange only requires knowing one’s individual valuation of  a 
good and prices reflect individual preference orderings without reference to the underlying reasons for 
which the good or service is valued. Therefore, in the marketplace, there is no need for shared values or 
shared understandings of  the items that are for sale. (There may be a shared understanding of  the 
situation, that this is a market transaction. However, a part of  that understanding is that individuals can 
have qualitatively different valuations of  the goods or services being exchanged, i.e. they can value the 
goods for different reasons.) In contrast, giving blood is an example of  what Taylor calls a “constitutive 
practice”. Implicit within them “is a certain vision of  the agent and his relation to others and society” 
and they “require that one’s actions and relations be seen in the light of  this picture and the 
accompanying norms” (Taylor, 1985, pp. 34-35).  
Titmuss makes a suggestion which would add detail to Taylor’s picture, that there are competing 
conceptions of  blood, as a gift that one gives and as a commodity that one sells. Gifts are thick 
normative concepts and gift giving is part of  a complex social web. The giving and receiving of  gifts 
brings a host of  obligations that vary between cultures (Mauss, 1954). Viviana Zelizer studied domestic 
transactions, gifts and charitable donations in the US between 1870 and 1930 (Zelizer, 1997). She found 
that people maintain strong distinctions among entitlements, gifts and payments, considering each to 
define different kinds of  social relations and meaning systems. It is important to distinguish a gift from 
a market transaction, and important to make gifts appear personal in order to avoid the interpretation 
that the transaction is merely payment for services. It is important to convey that something is 
understood as a gift, not a payment. 
Shared understandings may be fragile because they rely on mutual beliefs that others 
understand the good or service in the same way. In large scale situations, such as blood donation, we 
cannot discover everyone’s beliefs by communication. Rather we infer their beliefs from their actions. 
As Taylor puts it, social actions are communicative acts. The existence of  a market marks something 
out as a commodity, the creation of  a market for blood is a sign that the shared understanding that is 
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necessary for giving does not exist, and the participation of  people in that market is a further sign. The 
more people who are not participating, or the more salient the option of  non-participation, the more 
the existence of  the shared understanding is challenged. There is evidence of  the stability of  monetary 
frames (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). This is no wonder because, in general, mutual belief  is easier to 
break down than to create.   
 If  markets cause shared understandings to break down, they will also destroy shared valuations 
and prevent people from enjoying shared goods. Although one may think that blood should be a gift, 
and even decide to treat it as a gift, one cannot decide that it is a gift independent of  what other people 
in the community are doing. So if  the shared understanding is threatened by the behavior of  some 
individuals, it may not be possible for others to give it as a gift. Thus the spillover effect is explained, as 
are Titmuss’s assertions that an option is destroyed, that the market “narrows the choices for all 
men” (Titmuss, 1970, p.310-11) and that “private market systems … deprive men of  their freedom to 
give” (Titmuss, 1970, p.239). The crowding out of  motivation crowds out frames; shared valuations 
depend on shared understandings, so the crowding out of  frames can cause shared understandings and, 
hence, shared valuations to break down. Connecting the crowding out of  behavior with the destruction 
of  shared valuations shows how some people’s market transactions can affect other people’s valuations 
of  goods and services, hence providing a mechanism that could underpin the empirical premise. 
Although the mechanism is the crowding out of  motivations, the outcome is not simply a change in 
motivations; the result is the destruction of  the shared understanding of  blood as a gift and therefore 
the loss of  the option to give. 
Although I rejected the simple over-justification and signaling theories of  motivation crowding, 
this framing mechanism has elements of  both. The sense of  over-justification is not that of  being 
controlled, but of  actions that are over-determined by the agents’ reasons. So it is not that agents cease 
being intrinsically motivated because they dislike losing their autonomy, but that they tend to be one-
reason decision-makers so, when their actions are over-determined, some reasons tend to drop from 
sight. Whilst the payment for blood does not send a signal that the activity is unpleasant, nor the action 
of  donating send a signal that the donor is an altruist, the act of  selling blood is a signal that a shared 
understanding of  blood as a gift does not exist, so giving is not appropriate. 
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The account I have given contains a rather crude account of  shared understandings. There are 
at least two notable simplifications, which turn out to be related: that people are homogeneous, all 
either having the same understanding or not, and that shared understandings are binary in nature, either 
existing or not. In fact, people are heterogeneous and there may be vagueness around where a shared 
understanding passes into or out of  existence. These two points are connected. If  agents are 
heterogeneous, so different agents can be using different frames, then there is an issue of  how many 
agents have to share an understanding in order for a shared understanding to exist. In turn, resolving 
this vagueness is one source of  individual differences, as different individuals may have different 
thresholds of  how many others have to share the understanding before they consider a shared 
understanding to exist.  Some agents may be more tenacious in their shared understandings and less 18
likely to relinquish them in the face of  contrarian evidence. For instance, although I said above that a 
single individual cannot make gift be the social meaning of  blood independently of  the understandings 
of  others in the community, she could potentially decide unilaterally to treat blood as a gift, even in the 
face of  evidence that others do not treat it that way.  
Shared understandings are relative to a community. A further issue is what are the boundaries 
of  the community. If  an understanding is not shared in the wider community, one response for 
individuals who want to institute it as a shared understanding is to create a sub-community with like-
minded people, where their preferred understanding is shared. However, if  this route is not taken then, 
whilst people may believe that it is appropriate for something to be a shared good, they may not be able 
to sustain it as such.  
We are now in a position to answer Mack’s (1989) challenge. He asked why, if  non-market 
relations are so much better than commodified ones, do people not continue using the non-
commodified relations after markets are introduced? The answer is that, if  the non-market relation 
relies on a shared understanding and the introduction of  a market breaks down that shared 
understanding, then the non-market relation may no longer exist. It is also perfectly consistent to 
acknowledge that the non-market relation would be preferable, even though is it not available. Further, 
people sometimes do try to influence shared understandings or form sub-communities where the 
shared valuation exists. 
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I have offered a mechanism that can explain both Titmuss’s puzzle and the empirical premise 
of  commodification argumentsm. Of  course, this is not the only mechanism that might explain 
Titmuss’s puzzle. For instance, the introduction of  the market might change people’s expectations 
about what others will do. If  people care about the total amount of  blood collected and they think that 
paying for blood will make others more likely to give, then they would withdraw their own 
contribution. However, this explanation is inconsistent with the data on charitable giving (Sugden, 
1982). People want to make a contribution themselves, sometimes referred to a getting a “warm glow”, as 
well as wanting to reach a high total contribution level (Andreoni, 1990). In any case, my aim is not to 
argue that the framing explanation of  Titmuss’s puzzle is the only solution, it is to argue that the 
framing explanation is needed both to explain Titmuss’s puzzle about behavior change and to connect 
that behavior change to value change, as required for the empirical premise. To the extent that you 
think the correct explanation of  Titmuss’s puzzle involves, e.g., expectations, and does not connect 
behavior to values, so it cannot explain the empirical premise, then so much the worse for 
commodification arguments.  
6. Limiting the scope of  commodification arguments: why some shared valuations are 
vulnerable to the market but others are not 
I have shown that a framing mechanism can explain motivation crowding, solve Titmuss’s 
puzzle, and support the empirical premise in the case of  markets for blood. I also addressed the explicit 
challenge that Mack (1989) posed. Implicit in his example was a further, more vexing challenge: A 
plausible commodification argument needs to explain why markets devalue gifts of  blood but not gifts 
of  sweaters.  I said that a mechanism that gives an answer to the question of  why commodification 
occurs will also give guidance as to what goods may be commodified because it may place conditions on 
the type of  goods that are vulnerable to commodification. I turn to that issue now. 
In Anderson’s typology both blood and sweaters may be shared goods, whose value depends on 
other people enjoying the item according to shared understandings of  what they mean. Markets may 
drive out shared goods if  they cause shared understandings to break down. I explained how this might 
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happen using the example of  blood. However, it is not plausible that this mechanism would operate in 
the case of  sweaters.  
When Mack changed the example, he made a relevant change to the type of  good under 
discussion. Donating blood involves anonymous giving on a large social scale whereas, in the case of  
Mack’s sweater, the gift involves only him and his wife. There are many more people involved in the 
shared understanding underlying blood donation, there is less possibility of  communication, and there 
is less background knowledge of  the motivations and values of  others involved in the exchange. 
Between spouses, gifts can be personalized, by giving something that the receiver wants, needs or would 
like.  A paradigm gift reflects the giver’s thoughtfulness about and knowledge of  the receiver. A gift 19
between spouses is also given in the context of  an on-going relationship where there are other 
opportunities for showing love and respect, so the parties come to the gift exchange with background 
knowledge of  the other’s love and esteem. Hence, unlike knowing the price of  blood, knowing the 
price of  a gift from one’s spouse does not cause one to doubt the nature of  the relationship. 
Hence, the framing mechanism does not provide unqualified support for commodification 
arguments because the mechanism depends on the vulnerability of  the shared valuation, which is 
different between small-scale and large-scale social exchange. Small-scale exchanges allow some goods 
(like sweaters) to be partially commodified, with people knowing their price but still sustaining a shared 
valuation (for instance, as a symbol of  a loving relationship). In large-scale exchange, there is greater 
potential for lack of  mutual belief  about a shared understanding of  a good or service. For this reason, 
we might say that the shared understandings underpinning large-scale shared goods are likely to be 
weaker and more easily eroded than those underpinning smaller-scale shared goods.  
The scope of  commodification arguments is limited to goods and relationships that depend on 
relatively fragile shared understandings. In order to decide whether commodification arguments apply 
to any particular good, we would have to look in detail at the context of  the relationships and the 
shared valuations involved, in order to assess the robustness of  the shared understanding that 
underpins them, and decide whether the shared understanding was vulnerable to the market. 
However, this consideration may lead us to doubt whether commodification arguments are 
sound in one of  the other cases that Anderson and Radin discuss, namely the market for sexual 
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services. The shared understanding between the participants in intercourse only needs to be shared by 
them, and the shared understandings of  dyads and small groups are relatively strong. In George 
Orwell’s 1984, the Party tries to impose the shared understanding that sex is only for procreation, but, 
ultimately, it cannot prevent Winston Smith and Julia from having a meaningful sexual relationship 
based on their pairwise shared understanding of  what they are doing. (Although the Party can take 
steps to destroy the relationship when it discovers it.) Regarding prostitution, most people know that 
sexual intercourse is something that one could purchase. However, their sexual relationships need not 
become commodified because the shared understanding of  the participants about the meaning of  the 
interaction is likely to be strong enough to maintain intercourse as a shared good, even if  others are 
buying and selling sex. Therefore it seems likely that Radin (1989) is wrong when she says that “the 
existence of  some commodified sexual interactions will contaminate or infiltrate everyone’s sexuality so 
that all sexual relationships will become commodified.” (p.182) The existence of  prostitution does not 
prevent couples enjoying the shared and personal goods of  intimate sexual relationships.  20
 I have tackled the problem of  commodification from the perspective of  philosophers who study 
practical reasoning, which is the tradition that Anderson (1993) and Radin’s (1989, 1987) arguments hail 
from. This is complementary to approaches taken in sociology and, indeed, I have made use of  some 
sociological research. Whereas the practical reasoning approach focusses on the mental states of  
individuals, the sociological approach focusses on the study of  institutions, understood as systems that 
are governed by rules and norms, and which embed values. In that approach, Titmuss (1970) is read as 
saying that different institutions of  exchange encourage different behaviors and valuations. A market is 
one such institution. Instead of  contrasting market exchanges with non-market exchanges, one can 
investigate the nuance of  exchange and the ways in which people involved in markets (or other 
institutions) structure and mark their transactions in order to support or obscure social meanings of  
goods (Rossman, 2014; Almeling, 2011; Healey, 2010; Zelizer, 2010). So where I have talked of  frames 
and making efforts to frame a good in a particular way, market vs non-market, a sociologist might 
substitute talk of  the ways in which a particular market employs social relations in order to sustain 
social meanings of  goods. In the framework I have used, this would be operationalized as supporting 
or occluding frames. The two approaches differ in that the market as an institution is a hybrid in a way 
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that the market frame is not. One additional insight from the perspective from sociology is that 
participants in markets may take steps to prevent the transactions being viewed through the market 
frame. Thus we have yet another potential bulwark against commodification arguments. Contra Radin 
(1987) commodification is not a domino effect, where pushing over the first domino inevitably causes 
all the rest to topple, though it may exert pressures in that direction. 
7. Conclusion 
 I have connected political philosophy arguments about commodification to an empirical 
literature, especially regarding motivation crowding. I presented a mechanism by which markets might 
break down shared understandings and hence prevent people from enjoying shared goods, in 
Anderson’s (1993) sense. The crowding out of  motivation crowds out frames; shared valuations depend 
on shared understandings, so the crowding out of  frames can cause shared understandings and, hence, 
shared valuations to break down. This mechanism can explain the effect of  withdrawing payments, 
found in Deci’s original experiments, and the effect of  introducing payments; it connects behaviour to 
valuations and shows how some people’s behavior can spillover and affect other people’s valuations,  
However, whether or not a particular shared understanding is corroded by the market depends 
on how fragile it is. It is plausible that the shared understandings involved in large-scale social exchange 
are fragile and hence vulnerable to this mechanism. However, some shared understandings are more 
robust, especially those existing between a lesser number of  people and in the context of  long-term 
relationships. For this reason, it seems doubtful that prostitution breaks down the shared valuations 
involved in long-term sexual relationships, contra the claims of  Anderson and Radin. 
 The project of  connecting arguments from political philosophy to the empirical literature is 
important for all those who worry about the adverse effect of  markets. This is most obviously true for 
non-essentialist arguments against markets, which point only to their role in sustaining harmful 
outcomes, for example, Satz’s (2010) argument that prostitution is problematic because it is a “theatre 
of  inequality”, which contributes to sustaining the subordination of  women. However, empirical    
evidence can also be relevant to essentialist arguments. Commodification arguments are a type of  
essentialist argument that also relies on a mechanism to propagate essentialist effects. I used moral 
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psychology to explain why some people’s trading a good or service can debase it for third parties and 
showed how this can put conditions on what goods and services may be commodified, with 
implications for political theory. 
 Although I have drawn on an empirical literature in order to devise a mechanism, the 
mechanism I presented has yet to be empirically tested. To my knowledge, there are no existing 
experiments examining motivation crowding (of  behavior) in third parties, let alone the crowding out 
of  valuations in third parties. Obviously, it is important for commodification arguments that the 
hypothesized mechanism actually operates. But testing it is a task for another day and another paper.  
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 The set of  goods with use value is a strict subset of  extrinsic goods, as there are extrinsic goods that 1
do not have use value. For instance, a bracelet that is only valued as a token of  a friendship is an 
extrinsic good that is not valued as a means to an end.
 Anderson and Radin both talk of  female prostitutes and male clients; neither considers male 2
prostitutes, female clients, or same sex prostitution hence nor do I.
 For a view on the expressive value of  choice that would support this conclusion, see Scanlon (1998).3
 It should be noted that Deci and Ryan’s (2000) self-determination theory still includes feelings of  4
competence, as well as autonomy; it posits that individuals have psychological needs for autonomy, 
competence and relatedness (the development and maintenance of  close personal relationships with 
others). 
 There is no consensus on how exactly these terms are used. In the same way that motivation 5
crowding has been used to refer both to an empirical effect and to a hypothesis about the cause of  that 
effect, the term “over-justification” was coined by Lepper, Greene and Nisbett (1973) who defined it 
similarly to the way we now understand motivation crowding, as “the proposition that a person’s 
intrinsic interest in an activity may be undermined by inducing him to engage in that activity as an 
explicit means to some extrinsic goal”, but it has also been used as an explanation rather than just a re-
statement of  motivation crowding theory (Frey, 1997a; Underhill, 2016).
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 In fact, the asymmetry is the other way round: donors have information about the quality of  their 6
blood that the authorities lack. This does create a problem, namely that authorities must trust donors 
not to give blood if  they have infectious diseases. Titmuss also found that the amount of  infected 
blood donated in the US was higher than in the UK. Maybe not so surprising when one considers that 
a norm of  market transactions is caveat emptor, or buyer beware!
 This is in stark contrast with London Underground’s campaign in the 1990s, when the British 7
government increased the cost of  crime, introducing the London Regional Transport (Penalty Fares) 
Act, which passed in 1992, and ran a series of  radio commercials with the tag line “Get a ticket, not a 
criminal record”.
 This is of  particular relevance here because blood donation is a public good and could be modeled as 8
an n-person prisoners’ dilemma.
 However, we cannot assume that a player would see any given decomposition from the parent game 9
because, if  a prisoner’s dilemma is decomposable, then there are an infinite number of  possible 
decompositions (Messick & McClintock, 1968).
 It is possible to translate between the “value-based” model given by Tversky and Kahneman and the 10
“reason-based” tradition. Roughly, what Kahneman and Tversky describe as a change in curvature of  
the utility function becomes a difference in how people value the options. See also Gold & List (2004).
 This can also explain the higher cooperation rates when the prisoner’s dilemmas is called the 11
“community game” rather than the “Wall Street game” (Ward & Ross, 1997).
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 I was once offered, in the spirit of  a competing explanation, the idea that the change in framing in 12
the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma changes a player’s expectations about what the other player will do. 
For example, in the Rabin (1993) model of  reciprocal fairness, agents want to be kind to agents who 
they expect will be kind to them. So if  the decomposed dilemma leads a player to expect that her co-
player will cooperate and she cares about Rabin-kindness, then the change in expectations could lead 
her to cooperate. Alternatively, the framing may trigger a social norm, whereby it alters the expectation 
that others will cooperate, and people have a conditional preference that they cooperate given that 
others will too (Bicchieri, 2005). But why would decomposing the dilemma increase a player’s 
expectation that her co-player will be kind, except because the player is more likely to see the 
opportunity for kindness? In other words, there can only be a change in expectations because people 
realise that framing affects behavior. The change in expectations is parasitic on the possibility of  
changes in frame. Of  course, sometimes changing expectations can change behavior without a change 
in frame but, equally, there is recent evidence that framing can affect behavior without changing 
expectations (Cohn, Fehr, & Maréchal, 2014).
  For an overview of  the philosophical complexity of  reasons, including the intriguing possibility that 13
some philosophers would prefer to classify the “motivating reasons” that I discuss as “explanatory 
reasons”, see Alvarez (2016).
 Hence I side-step debates about what constitutes a framing effect. For more on different uses of  the 14
term see Kühberger (1998) and Frisch (1993).
  One way of  putting this is that the sort of  selective seeing of  a situation that is involved in framing 15
is irrational, that rationality requires us to see all possible ways of  framing it (Skyrms, 1998). That 
requirement is imposed by orthodox decision theory. However, in the prisoner’s dilemma, if  there is 
one way of  decomposing a matrix then there are an infinite number of  possible decompositions. This 
casts some doubt on whether it really is irrational not to see all the decompositions, but there is no 
space to pursue that argument here.
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  Bruner (1957) does not say how or why gating out occurs but, in cognitive psychology, there is a well 16
known effect called assimilation, where an agent perceives an object’s attributes as more typical of  the 
category that is being used than it actually is. Of  course, some incongruous cues may be so insistent 
that the agent cannot ignore them.
 So it may be the case that treating workers as though they are extrinsically motivated will actually 17
cause them to be so motivated, creating the need for incentives and rewards where none existed before. 
Further discussion of  the idea that designing institutions as if  people are knaves causes them to behave 
as such can be found in Frey (1997b).
  For threshold models of  behavior, as studied in sociology, see Granovetter (1978).18
  It is interesting that money is an acceptable gift only for inter-generational transfers between family 19
members. Even in casual gifts, between acquaintances, there is some onus to get something appropriate 
and to have invested some little effort in its purchase (Zelizer, 1997).
 This is not to deny that widespread prostitution might have a society-wide effect on how men see 20
women, as argued by Satz (1995). But that is a different argument.
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